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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Does the evidence support the trial court's award of

$75,000 for lost rents under the Lease?
2*

Did the trial court correctly award Olympus Hills

attorney's fees incurred in enforcing Landes1 obligation to
guarantee the Lease?
3c

Does the evidence support the trial court's award of

$15,000 for restoration expense?
4. Is Landes protected by bankruptcy law from the obligation
to honor his agreement to guarantee the Lease, even though he
himself has not filed bankruptcy?
5.

Was Landes' liability as a guarantor judicially

established in the prior suit and thus not subject to
relitigation in this action?
6.

Did steps taken in the prior suit to have Bagel Nosh

declared in unlawful detainer terminate the lease or Landes1
guarantor obligations?
7.

Does Landes' satisfaction of the prior judgment preclude

him from now contesting matters on which it was predicated?
8*

Does the submission of a post-trial affidavit attempting

to inform the trial court of the view of a Utah bankruptcy judge
on a point of bankruptcy law the trial court had found to be
immaterial warrant reversal?
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9

D:i d tl: u • • ti: :i a J cot ir t : • : n imi t r e^ rerai bJ e error when, i t

declined to strike si x exhibi ts suppor ting Olympus H. L 1 ] s" I lotion
1

-*- Summary

'-jdgment when the six exhibits were authenticated and,

created by the party wnr. s^yqr

o e x u u d e iiieni?

STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATIOI I
MAY BE DETERMINATIVE

S e c t i o n 78-36-1 0 ( 1 ) , lit ah Code Ann. :
If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer
after ... default in the payment of rent, m e
judgment shall also [in addition to ordering
restitution] declare the forfeiture of the
lease or agreement, (emphasis ad*ie^v-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The statutory authority which confers jurisdiction upon this
Court to decide this appeal is §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann.
Olympus Hills brought this suit in November of 1985 to
recover unpaid rent due under a long-term commercial lease from a
guarantor of that lease, Michael Landes.

In September of 1988,

Landes filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

In response, Olympus

Hills filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

After

argument and briefing, the District Court granted Olympus Hills'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ruling that Landes was
indeed a guarantor of the Lease and that the case should proceed
to trial to determine the extent of his liability.
The case was tried on February 9 and 10, 1989.

Following

the trial, the District Court granted Judgment against Landes in
the total sum of $134,639.51.
Landes appeals from that Judgment and from the District
Court's prior determination of his liability to Olympus Hills as
a guarantor of the Lease.

Olympus Hills seeks affirmance of the

Judgment and an award of costs and attorney's fees in defending
against the appeal.
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STATEMENT Of ' THE CASE
P1 a i n 111 :
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BageJ Nosh Holding Corp, agreed to J ease
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tei : 1 11:

Tin 1 e

mpus Hills threatened to ternii nate the Lease and

evict Bagel Nosh because of delinquencies and non-performance.
An arrangement was then made under which the Lease was allowed to
remain in effect in exchange for Michael Landes and Sidney Seftel
personally guaranteeing performance of the tenant's obligations
under the Lease.

(TR. 17-18? see also preamble to First

Amendment to Lease, Exhibit 3-P, p.l).
2.

Three years later - in July of 1984 - Olympus Hills sued

Bagel Nosh, Seftel and Landes to recover rent and other sums due
under the Lease and to evict the tenant (Bagel Nosh) because of
its nonpayment of rent.

(R. 180-183; 345-9).

That case, Third

District Court No. C84-4355, was separate from and prior to this
one.
3.

In that action, Olympus Hills alleged that on

July 15,

1981, Seftel and Landes executed a "First Amendment to Lease" in
which they personally guaranteed performance and payment by the
tenant under the Lease.
4.

(R. 346, para. 7).

Before that case went to trial, Bagel Nosh filed a

Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition. (R. 134). The Bankruptcy Court's
jurisdiction over the debtor-in-possession automatically stayed
further proceedings against the tenant.

Bagel Nosh chose to

affirm rather than reject the Olympus Hills Lease.

Such

affirmation was reflected in part by a stipulation filed with the
Bankruptcy Court.

That Stipulation provides in pertinent part:
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3• Deb t o r , C r edi t o r [01 ^ mpus I I i11s1 a i i d 11 I e 1e a s e •
g u a r a n t o r s h a v e agreed t o a repaymert s c h e d u l e to
s a t i s f y both t h e a r r e a r a g e d u e prior to t h e filing d a t e
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p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e c u r r e n t o b l i g a t i o n s as required by 11
U•S.C. Sect ion 36 5 ( d ) ( 3 ) .
•

r ' if

5 . T't le stipulation herein does n o t const I ti ite
a waiver of any rights Creditor m a y have
against the lease guarantors, and shall n o t be
construed to waive any of t h e Creditor's
rights against said guarantors a s referenced
in that certain civil action pendingr ;
Third J u d i c i a l C o u r t for Salt Lak** '-->ur
State of Utah, Civil N o . C84-4355(R. 171-175 r 3 7 5 ) .

;r December .
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agreemer-ti- - *r ea^r "*h^r.
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(R. 177-8).
6.

The Judgment was supported by Findings of Fact,

including the following:
3. On or about July 15, 1981, the parties
executed a "First Amendment to Lease" in which
defendants Sidney Seftel and Mike Landes
agreed, inter alia, to personally guarantee
performance and payment by the tenant under
the terms of the aforesaid lease agreement.
(R. 181).
7.

The Judgment was also supported by Conclusions of

Law, including the following:
1. Defendants Sidney Seftel and Mike Landes,
as guarantors of all payments and other
performance obligations of the lessee under
the lease agreement, are jointly and severally
personally liable for the unpaid, past-due
obligations owed thereunder, including some
$28,366.80 in unpaid rent, common area
maintenance fees, merchant association dues
and property taxes.
***

3. The reduction to judgment against
guarantors Sidney Seftel and Mike Landes of
the past-due unpaid sums owed in connection
with the Bagel Nosh lease does not terminate
the lease. Whatever obligations the lessee,
its assignees, and the guarantors have in
connection with the lease and/or occupancy of
the subject premises shall continue and are
not cut off or otherwise affected by the trial
and resulting judgment entered herein.

(R. 180 - 183).
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On October 8, 1985, a Plan of Reorganization and

Disclosure Statement were filed in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy
action by Landes' counsel. (R. 330 - 429).
Michael Landes as one of its proponents.

The Plan identifies

The Plan acknowledges

that Landes and Seftel "are the personal guarantors on certain
debt obligations held by the company". (R. 420). The Disclosure
Statement identifies Bagel Nosh's leasehold interest at the
Olympus Hills Shopping Center as an asset of the estate (R.
392-3).

The Disclosure Statement also lists Olympus Hills as an

unsecured creditor owed $24,849.68.

(R. 398). The Disclosure

Statement also acknowledges the continuing presence of personal
property, including bagel-making equipment, at the Olympus Hills
premises.
15.

(R. 402).

At the trial in this action, Olympus Hills presented

evidence that Landes owed some $321,132.54 in past-due unpaid
rent, restoration expenses and attorney's fees. (TR. 10). Landes
contended that he owed nothing because, among other reasons,
actions in Bagel Nosh's bankruptcy proceeding terminated his
obligations as guarantor of the Lease.

The trial court rejected

all of Landes' arguments that he owed nothing, but substantially
discounted Olympus Hills' claim.

The trial court awarded Olympus

Hills a judgment totalling $134,639.51. (R. 744-5).
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Argument IV;

Landes* argument that bankruptcy law protects him

from liability is groundless and unavailing because: 1)

as

Landes' own bankruptcy expert testified, even a "termination" of
the Lease vis a vis the debtor would not affect the obligations
of a guarantor; and 2) under bankruptcy lawf the Lease was
neither "rejected" nor "terminated".
A.

Even a "termination" of the Lease vis A vis the debtor in
bankruptcy would not affect the obligations of a Guarantor.

B.

Under bankruptcy law, the Lease was neither rejected nor
terminated.

C.

Landes* opaque assertions based on Section 24.02 of the
Lease are inaccurate.

Argument V:

Res judicata bars Landes from asserting any defenses

in this suit which were or could have been asserted in the prior
action.
Argument VI: Collateral estoppel bars Landes from denying his
status as guarantor.
Argument VII:

The Judgment in C84-4355 was a "final" Judgment

entitled to be given res judicata effect.
A.

The Judgment in C84-4355 is as "final" as the law requires
it to be for issue and claim preclusion purposes.

B.

The Judgment in C84-4355 was "final" because it did in fact
determine the rights and liabilities of all the parties and
reserved nothing for future determination.

Argument VIII;

Although satisfaction of the prior Judgment

should have foreclosed Landes from presenting his defenses to
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Argument XI: There is no evidence in the record that Landes paid
the prior Judgment "involuntarily".

Moreover Landes could have

appealed, but chose not to.
Argument XII: The filing of the post-trial affidavit attempting
to inform the trial court of a Utah bankruptcy judge's view on
the bankruptcy law question raised by Landes does not constitute
reversible error because: 1)

there is no indication the court

considered it; 2) the trial court's decision was based on other
grounds; 3)

the affidavit concerned a matter of law, not of

fact; and 4)

the affidavit contained no more hearsay than Mr.

Leta's testimony.
Argument XIII:

Landes' Argument Thirteen is frivolous and

illustrates his propensity to misstate facts and grasp at
meritless technicalities.

THE ARGUMENTS IN THIS BRIEF ARE STRUCTURED AND NUMBERED TO
CORRESPOND TO THE THIRTEEN ARGUMENTS SET FORTH IN LANDES' APPEAL
BRIEF.
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ARGUMENT I
THERE IS ABUNDANT UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT
OLYMPUS HILLS TOOK COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE STEPS
TO MITIGATE ITS LOSSES. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD
OF $75,000-00 FOR LOSS OF RENTALS WAS CONSERVATIVE
IN LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE UPHELD-

A.

Olympus Hills' Rent Loss Under the Lease as of the Time
of Trial was $134,424.88-

At trial, uncontroverted evidence was presented that the amount
owed under the Lease for rent, common area maintenance and
monthly promotional fees totalled $134,424-88-

(TR. 23-25).

This evidence was not rebutted, questioned or controverted.
For some reason, the District Court decided to award Olympus
Hills only the rent which accrued during the two year period
ending June of 1987, totalling $75,000. The Court gave no
indication as to the basis for its substantial discount.
B.

The Standard of Proof for Mitigation of Damages by a
Landlord is "Reasonable Mitigation Efforts Only".

In Reid v- Mutual of Omaha Ins- Co-, 776 P.2d 896 (Utah
1989), this Court was "faced with the question of whether Utah
law imposes a duty upon landlords to mitigate their damage by
reletting premises after a tenant has wrongfully vacated and
defaulted on the covenant to pay rent."

776 P.2d at 903-

After

noting a split of authority on the question, this Court carefully
considered several justifications other jurisdictions have
advanced in support of the "traditional rule" which does not
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require landlords to mitigate.

One justification noted by this

Court is the unfairness of allowing a breaching party
to force on the innocent landlord an
affirmative duty to seek out new tenants and
perhaps let the premises to tenants not
entirely suitable....
776 P.2d at 904.

In considering this justification, this Court

noted:
... [Tjhere is some validity to the concern
that the breaching party should not be able to
force its landlord to seek other tenants on
pain of losing bargained-for rents. However,
we think this point is outweighed by the
policy arguments in favor of the modern rule,
and we think any unfairness to the landlord
can largely be eliminated by careful
application of a rule requiring reasonable
mitigation efforts only, (emphasis added).
776 P. 2d at 905. This Court went on to hold that a landlord has
an obligation to take "commercially reasonable steps to mitigate
its losses".

776 P.2d at 906-

A landlord, then, must "take positive steps reasonably
calculated to effect a reletting of the premises".

The standard

is one of "objective commercial reasonableness":
A landlord is obligated to take such steps as
would be expected of a reasonable landlord
letting out a similar property in the same
market conditions, [citations omitted].
Obviously, the objective commercial
reasonableness of mitigation efforts is a fact
question that depends heavily on the
particularities of the property and the
relevant market at the pertinent point in
time, [citations omitted].
776 P.2d at 907.
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C.

By Cumulative, Quality Evidence, Olympus Hills Met its
Burden^ by Proving that it took Commercially Reasonable
Steps to Mitigate its Losses.

The District Court found that Olympus Hills attempted to
relet the premises. (Findings of Fact No. 14, R. 752). It also
found that although Olympus Hills "had opportunities to lease the
premises for a short term such as three years to a mom and pop
operation," it refused to relet under such circumstance because
such "prospective mom and pop tenants did not meet [its]
criteria."

(R. 752). Somewhat inexplicably, the District Court

included among its conclusions of law the conclusion that
"The Plaintiff did not use its best efforts to relet the
premises."

(R. 753). The recent holding of this Court does not

require a landlord to use "best efforts".

It requires a landlord

to take "commercially reasonable" steps to effect a reletting of
the premises.

The fact that the District Court awarded

$75,000.00 for unpaid rents is an indication that it believed
Olympus Hills did in fact take commercially reasonable steps to
relet.
An award of damages must be upheld if there is evidence in
the record to support it. Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer
Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984); Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499
(Utah 1976).

And a reviewing Court should affirm a trial court's

award whenever it can do so on a proper ground, even though not

This case was tried five months before the Reid decision was
handed down. Query: is it fair to hold Olympus Hills to a
burden of which it had no notice? See Malan v. Lewis, 676 P.2d
661, 667 (Utah 1984).
-26-

the ground the trial court relied

on in its ruling.

Bill Nay &

Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const. Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984) •
In this case, there is abundant, cumulative evidence that Olympus
Hills actly reasonably and prudently in trying to mitigate its
losses.
During the two year period ending April, 1987, Del Webb
Realty was employed as manager of the shopping center.
134).

(TR.

Throughout that time, Michael C. Gardner was the leasing

manager.

In addition to overseeing efforts to lease the Bagel

Nosh space, he was personally involved in efforts to secure a new
tenant.

During that period, meetings were held weekly to discuss

possible new tenants (R. 149-150).

Among the restaurant

operations Mr. Gardner and others attempted to interest in the
Bagel Nosh space were the Sizzler, Ponderosa, Marie Calendar's,
Delia Fontana, Godfather's Pizza, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Dee's
Family Restaurant and Studebaker's. (TR. 29, 150, 139). Other,
non-restaurant operations were also approached, including
Sterling Furniture, Ernst Hardware and Shopko.

(TR. 150, 139).

Approximately 30 tenants were actively approached to re-lease the
premises.

(TR. 139).

Mr. Gardner's impression was that Olympus Hills was genuinely
interested in reletting the space.

(TR. 151). This impression

was based on numerous meetings with Olympus Hills principals in
which strategies to lease the space were formed.

Mr. Gardner's

company prepared and disseminated a brochure including pictures,
demographic information, floor plan, etc. in an effort to market
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the space•

Many of the prospective tenants preferred to locate

space elsewhere in the Salt Lake valley.

A major obstacle was

the poor physical condition in which Bagel Nosh left the space.
(TR. 152).
Del Webb's property manager in charge of the entire Olympus
Hills Shopping Center was David W. Pugh.

He testified that Bagel

Nosh left large pylon signs in front of the premises and, despite
repeated requests, refused to remove them.

The signs were still

present as of the time of trial. (TR. 136). He also testified
that Bagel Nosh had left its bagel-making machinery and other
substantial items of property in the premises

until

approximately February of 1986.

Great effort was

(TR. 135-6).

made to get the Bagel Nosh principals to remove the equipment so
that the space could be relet. (TR. 136). After the equipment
was finally removed, considerable expense was incurred in
attempting to clean up the space.

(TR. 138).

During the two years Mr. Pugh was property manager, he never
received any information that Olympus Hills did not want the
space to be relet or was not interested in actively pursuing a
new tenant. (TR. 140). On the contrary, he testified that good
faith efforts were continually made to acquire a new tenant
throughout the time he was the property manager.

(TR. 140).

Olympus Hills1 general partner, Richard Skankey, also so
testified.

(TR. 29, 32, lines 16-20).

In April, 1987, Olympus Hills hired Coldwell Banker as its
new property manager.

One of its leasing agents was Don Michael

Nielson.

Mr. Nielson had been involved in serious efforts to

secure a tenant for the Bagel Nosh space even before Coldwell
Banker's appointment to manage the property.

In the Summer of

1985, Mr. Nielson became aware that the Sizzler national
restaurant chain was interested in opening a restaurant in the
Holladay area.

(TR. 155). From that point on, he engaged in

good faith negotiations to get Sizzler into the Bagel Nosh space.
His motivation was purely pecuniary.

If he succeeded, he would

receive a large commission as the procuring leasing agent.
156).

(TR.

Mr. Nielson*s work with Sizzler extended over a two and

one-half year period.

(TR. 156). Ultimately, it was learned

that Sizzler could not use the space without substantial
renovation.

The cost of the desired renovations was prohibitive.

(TR. 33). Mr. Nielson testified that he and his company have
continued efforts to make profitable use of the space vacated by
Bagel Nosh. (TR. 158).
It is true that evidence was presented at trial to the effect
that Olympus Hills may have been able to relet the space to a
small, unproven tenant on a short term basis.

However, there are

several commercially reasonable reasons why Olympus Hills might
choose not to lease the space to such a tenant.

Olympus Hills'

witnesses so testified.
Under existing economic conditions, allowing an unproven or
"morn and pop" tenant to occupy the space would constitute a risky
financial gamble.

The chances that the tenant would fail within
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a few months would be high.

The expenses of making the space

suitable for that tenant would have been wasted and new renovation
costs would have to be incurred.

(See TR. 75-76).

Besides the loss of capital involved in re-renovating the
space, there are other sound reasons for Olympus Hills' natural
reluctance to lease to such a tenant:
... besides being funds that you're out when
that tenant comes and goes, there is also a
great deal of other involvement, hassle,
negotiations, legal activities, that are not
very productive; plus it makes it difficult to
get another tenant if you put in weak tenants
that keep turning over.
(TR. 84).
That the re-renovating expenses and rent shortfall could
ultimately be charged to Landes under his commitment to guarantee
the 20 year Bagel Nosh lease hardly increases the commercial
attractiveness of reletting the space to a risky new tenant.
This case is a solemn testament to the unproductive "hassle" and
almost prohibitive cost of attempting to recover from a
guarantor.

(See Exhibit 31-P; TR. 162-164).

There is no evidence that Olympus Hills deliberately decided
against reletting the space in order to make its guarantor
suffer.

On the contrary, allowing the space to remain vacant

caused Olympus Hills itself to suffer.

The vacancy

made it

more difficult to attract and retain viable tenants throughout
the Center.

(TR. 85). However, it still made more sense to wait

for a solid tenant and reasonable terms than to rent the space to

an unreliable short term tenant.
The evidence showed that leasing the space to an unproven,
short term tenant would not be commercially reasonable.

Olympus

Hills tried mightily, but unsuccessfully, to relet the space to a
tenant and on terms which made economic sense.

It should not be

penalized for making decisions which, based on an objective view
of the facts, were commercially reasonable.

ARGUMENT II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE: 1) LANDES IS A PARTY
TO THE LEASE, AS AMENDED; 2) ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE
AMONG THE CHARGES LANDES AGREED TO GUARANTEE; AND
3) LANDES' LIABILITY FOR OLYMPUS HILLS' FEES IN
ENFORCING THE LEASE WAS JUDICIALLY ESTABLISHED
IN THE PRIOR CASE (C84-4355).
The "First Amendment to Lease" which Landes executed (Exhibit
3-P) incorporates itself into the Lease Agreement and
incorporates the Lease Agreement into itself.

The document

refers to itself at paragraph eight as "this Amended Lease
Agreement".

In paragraph one, Landes expressly agrees to

"personally guarantee the terms of this First Amended Lease".
Paragraph two provides that "Article I of the Lease is amended by
adding after the words 'name of guarantor' the names Seftel and
Landes".

Paragraph eight of the document expressly amends the

underlying Lease by adding to it a Section 29.19 specifically
providing that Seftel and Landes personally guarantee the terms
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of the "Amended Lease Agreement".

In short, the First Amendment

to Lease which Landes signed makes him a party to the Lease
Agreement.
As a party to the Lease and a guarantor of the tenants1
leasehold obligations, Landes is liable for the rent,
assessments, damages and fees for which the Agreement makes
provision.

The attorney's fees incurred

in enforcing the lease

are among the charges Landes agreed to guarantee.
Over a year before this action was commenced, Olympus Hills
sued and obtained a Judgment against Landes for rent owed under
the Lease.
fees.

That Judgment included an assessment of attorney's

(R. 178). The attorney's fees award against Landes was

supported by express findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(R. 182, para. 5 of Findings and para. 2 of Conclusions).
Principles of collateral estoppel, res judicata and judicial
estoppel preclude Landes from denying his liability for the
reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Olympus Hills in enforcing
his obligations under the contract.

See Arguments V through VII,

infra.
At trial, Olympus Hills presented testimonial and documentary
evidence that its reasonable attorney's fees incurred in
enforcing Landes' contractual obligations in this action were
$20,925.15.

(TR. 162-164; Exhibit 31-P).

rebuttal evidence.

Landes offered no

The District Court awarded $16,667.00.

The District Court's award of attorney's fees should stand.
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ARGUMENT III
THERE IS AMPLE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE WHICH
WOULD SUPPORT A RESTORATION EXPENSE AWARD FAR
IN EXCESS OF THE $15,000-00 AWARDED BY THE TRIAL
COURT. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONSERVATIVE AWARD
SHOULD BE UPHELD.
Landes1 Argument III rests entirely on his notion that he can
be held liable only for the cost of restoring the space Mto its
condition before the Lessee took possession". (Landes1 Brief, p.
16).

Landes contends that the evidence on the condition of the
2
premises when Bagel Nosh moved in was skimpy and therefore no
award for restoration expense should have been made. Neither the

2
Landes1 assertion that no such evidence was presented is
untrue. Olympus Hills' general partner gave testimony as
follows:
M
Q. Okay. My question is: Do you have a
figure or have you had someone calculate a
figure of what it would cost to take the
premises not for just Sizzler or Pancho Villa,
but back to the condition it was before this
Lease was signed?
A.

Yeah.

I think that number I gave -

Q.

You think it would cost $175?

A.

$175,000.00.

A. I mean $175,000.00 to remove the building
back to a shell? A. To where it was when the
tenant - when Bagel Nosh moved in." (TR. 93).
As to the condition of the premises when Bagel Nosh moved in, Mr.
Skankey gave explicit testimony that flooring, wall covers,
ceiling, lighting, plumbing, electrical, heating and air
conditioning fixtures were present, as well as some partitions
and counters. It was more than a bare wall "shell". (TR. 53-54;
95-96).
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Lease or controlling case law supports Landes' notion.

The

Lease provides with abundant clarity that the owner:
may from time to time without terminating this
Lease, make such alterations and repairs as
may be necessary in order to relet the
premises (emphasis added).
(Exhibit 2, Section 24.02, p. 23).The Lease goes on to provide
that the expenses incurred in so preparing the space for
reletting may be charged to the tenant (or, here, guarantor) by
allowing the owner to deduct such costs before applying the new
tenant's rent proceeds toward the defaulting tenant's continuing
obligation under the Lease.

(Id.).

The Lease also provides elsewhere that the tenant is
responsible for all repairs and maintenance "including but not
limited to ... windows, plate glass ... the mechanical, plumbing,
heating, air conditioning, ventilating and electrical equipment
and systems; partitions, and all other fixtures, appliances and
facilities furnished by owner". (Exhibit 2-P, Section 14.02, p.
15).

If the tenant fails to make such repairs, the owner may

make them and "upon completion thereof, tenant shall pay owner's
cost of making such repairs plus 20% for overhead".

(Exhibit

2-P, Section 14.03, p. 15).
Even if the Lease did not entitle Olympus Hills to recover
its costs of making the space relettable, Utah case law does.
This Court has recently held as a matter of common law that a
landlord is entitled to recover from a breaching tenant the
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"costs of repairs or alterations of the premises reasonably
necessary to successfully relet them".

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha

Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 907 (Utah 1989).
In short, Olympus Hills' measure of damage for restoration
expense under both the Lease and Utah case law is the cost
necessary to make the premises relettable.

The evidence Olympus

Hills produced at trial was precisely on point.
Expert witness Roger P. Knight testified without
controversion that the cost of restoring the premises to a
condition that would be suitable for a prospective tenant to
begin making modifying improvements for its own use would be
$165,000.00 (TR. 126-34).

Mr. Knight testified that 24

photographs admitted into evidence as Exhibits 4 - 2 8

accurately

depict the terrible condition in which the premises were left
after Bagel Nosh moved out. (TR. 131). He testified, and the
photographs demonstrate, that Bagel Nosh's attachments to the
heating, air conditioning, electrical and plumbing fixtures were
"ripped out" in such a way as to increase the cost of restoring
the premises.

(TR. 129-131).

He further testified that it would

cost "somewhere in the neighborhood of $250,000.00" to raze the
building and replace it.

(TR. 131).

Landes offered no rebuttal evidence.

Landes did not deny

that the photographs accurately reflect the condition in which
Bagel Nosh left the premises when it vacated.

The record is

devoid of any evidence or even argumentary basis for reducing the
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restoration element of Olympus Hills' damage from $165,000.00 to
$15,000.00.

The District Court's $15,000.00 award was

conservative in the extreme.

It should be upheld, if not

liberally increased.

ARGUMENT IV

LANDES' ARGUMENT THAT BANKRUPTCY LAW PROTECTS HIM
FROM LIABILITY IS GROUNDLESS AND UNAVAILING BECAUSE:
1) AS LANDES' OWN BANKRUPTCY EXPERT TESTIFIED, EVEN A
"TERMINATION" OF THE LEASE VIS A VIS THE DEBTOR WOULD
NOT AFFECT THE OBLIGATIONS OF A GUARANTOR; AND 2) UNDER
BANKRUPTCY LAW, THE LEASE WAS NEITHER "REJECTED" NOR
"TERMINATED".
A.

Even a "Termination" of the Lease Vis A Vis the Debtor in
Bankruptcy Would Not Affect the Obligations of a Guarantor.

Landes argues that Bagel Nosh "rejected" the Olympus Hills
Lease by failing to properly affirm it and that such rejection
constitutes a termination of the Lease.

Landes admits at page 21

of his brief that there is a "distinct split of authority in the
federal courts" concerning whether the rejection of a lease
constitutes a termination or merely a breach of the lease. At
trial, the Court allowed Landes to call a bankruptcy attorney,
David Leta, to instruct the Court on bankruptcy law.
Mr. Leta gave his view as to the effect of a debtor's
rejection of a lease.

Although he could produce no Utah

bankruptcy case supporting his view, he gave his opinion that the
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"majority" of courts which had dealt with the issue recently have
concluded that rejection of a lease constitutes termination.

His

testimony on this point, however, was rendered immaterial by his
later clear testimony that even a "termination" of the lease, as
far as the debtor's obligation is

concerned,

does not affect

obligations of a guarantor of the lease:
Q. ... following rejection of the Lease by
the bankrupt tenant, what rights to damages
or other recovery would the landlord have
against the guarantors because you said again
the tenant is defined by the Bankruptcy Code.
Does the Bankruptcy Code define the
liability of the guarantors?
A. No, no. The Bankruptcy Code - and this is
where A. J. Mackay may have some application.
The remedies in bankruptcy are unique to
those whose seek it, and those who do not
seek it don't get the benefit of those who
do. So, it doesn't have an effect on the
guarantor's liability, but there this case guarantor's liability would be fixed by the
guarantee for the term of whatever instrument
it was guaranteeing. The language of the
Lease, for example, or the language of the
guarantee would determine the liability of
the guarantor.
The Court:

If I understand you correctly, he takes out
bankruptcy, the guarantor still would be liable -

The Witness:

Could still be liable under the Lease based on
whatever the Lease provided or whatever the
guarantee provided, (emphasis added).

(TR. 237-8).
Later, Landes' counsel confirmed the accuracy of the Court's
understanding that rejection and even "termination" of the Lease
does not impact the guarantor's liability:
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Mr. Jackson:

... and so he's absolutely right and
we now direct ourselves to the terms
of the Lease and the liability of the
tenant upon termination of the Lease.

The Court:

But the tenant may not be liable
because of the bankruptcy
proceedings.

Mr. Jackson:

That's correct.

The Court:

But the guarantors could be liable
for the full time, full 20 years.

Mr. Jackson:

That's correct, and we have to look
at the terms of the Lease.
**•

The Court:

... it appears to me based upon Mr.
Leta's testimony and from what I have
been able to - from your arguments
and testimony here that the
guarantors, pursuant to their
guarantee, are liable for the rents.
It is now an issue as to what the
extent of the liability is as to that
Lease.

Mr. Jackson:

Exactly, as I see it. (emphasis
added)

(TR. 240, 267).
In short, even if a majority of courts consider a rejection
of a lease to be a "termination" and even if that view had
been adopted by the bankruptcy courts in Utah (which it hasn't;
See R. 701-2), such "termination" would not impact a guarantor's
liability.

The Trial Court's conclusion that the Bagel Nosh

Bankruptcy proceedings did not affect the obligations of the
non-bankrupt guarantor (Conclusion of Law No. 4, R. 753) is
unassailable because it is based on the testimony of Landes' own
bankruptcy expert.
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B.

Under Bankruptcy law, the Lease was Neither Rejected
Nor Terminated.

On page 19 of his brief, Landes argues that the Lease was
rejected, by operation of bankruptcy law, on the 61st day
following Bagel Nosh's bankruptcy filing because Bagel Nosh
failed to assume it with requisite formality.

In suggesting that

the Lease was terminated by Bagel Nosh's failure to properly
assume it, Landes cites at page 20 of his brief a Colorado case
for the proposition that a debtor may not "unilaterally" assume a
lease*

Bagel Nosh did not assume the Lease "unilaterally"; it

did so by means of a written stipulation signed by both itself
and Olympus Hills and filed with the bankruptcy court well within
60 days of the bankruptcy filing. (R. 171-175).
Landes suggests that a lease cannot be assumed by conduct but
only by a formal motion and order within 60 days of the filing of
bankruptcy.
law in Utah.

This is simply contrary to controlling bankruptcy
In In re By-rite Distributing, Inc., 55 B.R. 740

(Bkrtcy. D.C. Utah 1985), Chief Judge Bruce Jenkins, ruling on an
appeal from Utah's Bankruptcy Court, declared:
The code does not specify how the trustee is
to assume or reject a lease ... .
***

The court concludes that the trustee assumes
or rejects the lease within the meaning of
§365(d)(4) when he makes up his mind to do so
and communicates his decision in an
appropriate manner, such as by filing a motion
to assume.
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55 B.R. at 743. Bagel Nosh made up its mind to assume the Lease
by paying the post-petition obligations due under the Lease and
by undertaking to retire the pre-petition rent arrearage.

It

communicated its decision by executing and persuading Olympus
Hills to execute the formal stipulation filed with the Bankruptcy
Court on December 31, 1984.
In signing the bankruptcy stipulation, Olympus Hills gave up
any contract right it initially may have had to declare the Lease
terminated and evict its tenant.
continue.

It agreed to allow the Lease to

All the parties, including Landes, recognized its

continuation.

Landes1 repeated attempts now to argue that the

Lease was in fact terminated ought to disturb this Court.
Even if Bagel Nosh could be deemed to have rejected the Lease,
our research suggests Mr. Leta was in error in his assertion that
the weight of recent authority holds with the "termination" view.
The following post-1984 decisions hold that a rejection
constitutes a breach, not a termination, of the lease:

*Sharon

Steel Corp. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp,, 872 F.2d 36,
41 (3rd Cir. 1989); *Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985); *In re
Blackburn, 88 B.R. 273, 276 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. 1988);

*In re

Picnic 'N Chicken, Inc., 58 B.R. 523, 525 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal.
1986); *In re Storage Technology Corp., 53 B.R. 471, 475 (Bkrtcy.
D. Colo. 1985); Societe Nationale Algerienne v. Distrigas Corp.,
80 B.R. 606, 608-09 (Bkrtcy. D. Mass. 1987); *In re Hardie, 100
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B.R. 284, 285 (Bkrtcy. E.D. N.C. 1989); *In re Monqe Oil Corp.,
83 B.R. 305, 308 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Pa. 1988); and In re Silk Plants,
Etc., 100 B.R. 360, 362 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Tenn. 1989).

The

asterisked opinions are particularly insightful in their analysis
of the issue.

See, also, In re A.J. Mackay Co., 50 B.R. 756

(Bkrtcy<, D.C. Utah 1985); and Beconta, Inc. v. Schneider, 41 B.R.
878 (Bkrtcy. D.C. Mich. 1984).

C.

Landes* Opaque Assertions based on Section 24.02 of the
Lease are Inaccurate.

At the conclusion of trial, Landes' counsel argued for the
first time that somehow what happened in the bankruptcy court
limits Olympus Hills' recovery rights to a formula supposedly set
forth in Section 24.02 of the Lease.

The argument counsel

advances on this point might charitably be described as obscure.
Section 24.02 expressly provides that the Landlord's re-entry
and taking possession of the premises does not of itself
constitute an election to terminate the Lease.

The section then

goes on to set forth a damage formula which may apply "in
addition to any other remedies [the owner] may have ... should
owner at any time terminate this Lease for any breach". (Exhibit
2 at 23-24).

The formula that Landes seeks to have applied and

which he claims results in a finding of zero liability is
inapplicable.

Olympus Hills1

general partner repeatedly

testified that he never elected to terminate the Lease. (TR. 24,
86, 271 lines 20-25).

In short, the argument and subarguments advanced on pages 18
through 25 of Landes' brief are without merit.

ARGUMENT V
RES JUDICATA BARS LANDES FROM ASSERTING ANY
DEFENSES IN THIS SUIT WHICH WERE OR COULD
HAVE BEEN ASSERTED IN THE PRIOR ACTION.
It is the strong policy of the law to prevent piecemeal
litigation.

That policy is served by the doctrine of res

judicata which precludes the assertion of a defense which could
have been raised in an earlier suit.

This doctrine has long been

recognized in Utah:
[a] valid judgment for plaintiff is conclusive
not only as to defenses which are set up and
adjudicated, but also as to those which might
have been raised, so that a defendant can
neither set up such defense in a second action
between the same parties nor in a further
proceeding in the same action. Everill v.
Swan, 20 Utah 56, 57 P. 716; 34 C.J. 856, 859.
Utah Builders' Supply Co. v. Gardner, 39 P.2d 327, 328 (Utah
1934).

See also Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379 (Utah

1974); Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971); Todaro v.
Gardner, 285 P.2d 839 (Utah 1955).

As stated in Logan v. Utah

Power & Light, 16 P.2d 1097, 1101 (1932):
It is well settled that it is the duty of a
party to interpose such defense as it may have
to an action brought against it, and, if it
fails to do so, the resulting judgment is
conclusive against it as to all matters of
defense which were or might have been
interposed.
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In the earlier action (C84-4355), Landes might have raised
various defenses in an effort to establish that he was not a
guarantor.

He failed to do so.

After the Court found him to be

a guarantor, he acquiesced in such finding.
new trial nor appealed from the finding.
became a "thing decided".

He neither sought a

His status as guarantor

Landes is barred from now attempting

to undo the established fact of his guarantorship.

ARGUMENT VI
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL BARS LANDES FROM DENYING
HIS STATUS AS GUARANTOR.
Collateral estoppel, referred to in Section 27 of the
Restatement 2d of Judgments (1982) as the doctrine of issue
preclusion, requires that:

When an issue of fact or law is actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential
to the judgment, the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the
parties, whether on the same or a different
claim.
Id.
This Court approvingly quoted the foregoing rule in Robertson
v. Campbell, 647 P.2d 1226, 1230 n.l (Utah 1983).

In that

opinion, this Court held that collateral estoppel precludes

relitigation
of issues actually tried in a prior action,
and it may be invoked even though the
subsequent cause of action is different from
the former. [Citations omitted]
***

The applicability of collateral estoppel does
not depend on whether the claims for relief are
the same. Searle Bros, v. Searle, supra.
What is critical is whether the issue that was
actually litigated in the first suit was
essential to resolution of that suit and is
the same factual issue as that raised in a
second suit. Id.
647 P.2d at 1230.
The four tests for the applicability of collateral estoppel
are all met in this case.

1)

An issue decided in the prior

adjudication is identical to the issue presented in this action:
namely, did Landes guarantee performance of the Bagel Nosh Lease?
2)

There was a final judgment on the merits.

3)

The party

against whom collateral estoppel is asserted (Landes) was a party
to the prior adjudication. 4)

The issue of Landes1 status as

guarantor was competently, fully and fairly litigated in the first
case.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered
by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on January 25, 1985 in Case
No. C84-4355 were binding upon the parties and upon Judge Rokich
in this case.

They are also binding on this Court.

A critical issue decided in that case was whether Landes was
personally liable as a guarantor of the tenant's lease
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obligations*

Judge Wilkinson found on the basis of evidence

presented to him that Landes did guarantee the Bagel Nosh Lease.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of Landes1
liability as a guarantor of the Lease.

Having been judicially

established, his status as a guarantor may not be questioned nowo
The doctrine of collateral estoppel aside, Landes' consistent
subsequent actions acknowledging his liability as guarantor
should preclude him from contesting his personal liability.
Subsequent to the entry of judgment in the prior case, Landes
consistently acknowledged his legal obligation to guarantee
performance under the Lease.

He acquiesced in the entry of the

Judgment and, through his counsel, approved the Findings and
Conclusions establishing his liability as guarantor.

The

Judgment Landes' counsel approved expressly stated that it "does
not terminate or otherwise alter the continuing obligations'* of
the guarantors.
that Judgment.

Landes chose not to appeal or otherwise contest
He further acknowledged his liability as

guarantor by confessing Judgment on the debt in New York and
thereafter paying the Judgment. (R. 185-188).
Landes later manifested his continuing liability as guarantor
by paying portions of Bagel Nosh's continuing lease obligations
through May of 1985. (R. 195-199).

Landes' assertion that "a transcript of this proceeding does
not exist" (Appellant's Brief, p. 30) is gratuitous. The trial
was conducted "on the record". If Landes wanted a transcript, he
could have ordered one from Judge Wilkinson's court reporter.

Several months later - on September 9, 1985 - Landes1
attorney wrote a letter to Olympus Hills1 counsel acknowledging
that the Olympus Hills Lease had not, as of that time, been
terminated and indicating that Bagel Nosh's principals (Landes,
et al.) "would like to be released from their obligation under
the ... Lease".

(R. 379).

One month later, Landes' counsel filed a Plan of
Reorganization and Disclosure Statement in the Bagel Nosh
Bankruptcy action.
of the Plan.

Landes is identified as one of the proponents

The Plan identifies Landes as a personal guarantor

(R. 420).
Landes could not have acknowledged his liability as guarantor,
more strongly than by these actions.
The doctrine of "judicial estoppel" is often invoked by
courts to prevent a litigant from alleging facts inconsistent
with a position taken by that litigant in earlier litigation or
from otherwise "playing fast and loose" with the judicial
process.

See IB Moore, Federal Practice, Section 405(8) at 239

(2d Ed. 1978).

See also Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162

(4th Cir. 1982); Scarano v. New Jersey Central Railroad, 203 F.2d
510 (3rd Cir. 1953).

A litigant is not free to argue facts which

contradict an earlier position whenever self-interest suggests a
change.

Judicial estoppel should bar Landes from denying he

guaranteed the Lease.
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ARGUMENT VII
THE JUDGMENT IN C84-4355 WAS A "FINAL" JUDGMENT
ENTITLED TO BE GIVEN RES JUDICATA EFFECT.
A.

The Judgment in C84-4355 is as "Final" as the Law
Requires it to be for Issue and Claim Preclusion
Purposes.

Landes claims that neither res judicata nor collateral
estoppel applies to the Judgment in C84-4355 because it was not a
"final" judgment.

This assertion is not supported by an analysis

of the facts or the recognized authorities*
Excellent authority holds:
It is true that "finality" has sometimes been
equated with "appealability" in the context of a
particular case, [citations omitted]. However,
"final" in the res judicata or collateral
estoppel sense is not identical to "final" in
the rule governing the jurisdiction of the
appellate courts. [citations omitted]. An
examination of the policies underlying res
judicata and collateral estoppel and the
requirement that judgments be "final" to be
appealable show why this is so.
Res judicata
is not merely a matter of procedure inherited
from a more technical era but is founded on the
policy of preventing needless litigation,
[citations omitted]. It is "a principle which
seeks to bring litigation to an end and promote
certainty in legal relations", [citations
omitted].
***

It follows, therefore, that "final" for res
judicata purposes must be construed in the
light of the considerations of that doctrine,
rather than be automatically equated with
"final" in the final judgment rule.
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Sherman v. Jacobsen, 247 F.Supp. 261 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
Cases in accord include:

Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining

Co., 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 986, 82
S.Ct. 601, 7 L.Ed.2d 524 (1962); also Zednoak v. Glidden Co., 327
F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 934, 84 S.Ct. 1338, 12
L.Ed.2d 298 (1964); U. S. ex rel DiGianqiermo v. Regan, 528 F.2d
1265 (2d Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 3172,
49 L.Ed.2d 1187 (1976).
This Court has approvingly cited the Restatement 2d of
Judgments.

See, e.g. Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 at

1230 n.l (Utah 1983).

Section 13 of the Restatement provides:

The rules of res judicata are applicable only
when a final judgment is rendered. However,
for purposes of issue preclusion (as
distinguished from merger and bar), "final
judgment" includes any prior adjudication of
an issue in another action that is determined
to be sufficiently firm to be accorded
conclusive effect.
Significantly, comment b to this section states in pertinent
part:
Thus when res judicata is in question, a
judgment will ordinarily be considered final in
respect to a claim (or a separate part of a
claim. . .) if it is not tentative,
provisional or contingent and represents the
completion of all steps in the adjudication of
the claim by the court, short of any steps by
way of execution or enforcement, that may be
consequent upon the particular kind of
adjudication.
Judge Wilkinson's Judgment was in no sense tentative,
provisional or contingent.

He did not reserve for future
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determination any issue of law or fact essential to the
4
Judgment.
The Judgment was specific in amount, final in form
and well-defined in scope.
As the renowned Judge Friendly has stated, "finality" for
purposes of issue and claim preclusion
may mean little more than that the litigation
of a particular issue has reached such a stage
that a court sees no really good reason for
permitting it to be litigated again.
Lummus, supra, 297 F.2d at 89.
According to Judge Friendly, "general expressions that only
final judgments can ever have collateral estoppel effect are
considerably overstated".

See Kurland v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 343 F.2d 625, 628-629 n.l (2d Cir. 1965).

The

enlightened, widely-accepted view now is:
To be "final" for purposes of collateral
estoppel the decision need only be immune, as
a practical matter, to reversal or amendment.
Miller Brewing v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 996
(7th Cir. 1979).

Judge Wilkinson's decision in C84-4355 is

certainly immune, as a practical matter, to reversal or
amendment.

No attempt was made to set it aside or have

it amended.

Nor was any request made to have it certified under

Rule 54(b).

No appeal was sought.

Any question over whether Judge Wilkinson was on notice that
the Bankruptcy Court's automatic stay precluded him from
exercising jurisdiction over Bagel Nosh Holding Corp. is
dispelled by the face of his Judgment, which declares in its
preamble: "An officer of defendant Bagel Nosh Holding Corp. was
present but indicated to the Court that he was not present as a
participant, his corporation having filed bankruptcy."
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Landes' satisfaction of the Judgment, more than any
other practical matter could have done, rendered it "immune to
reversal or amendment".
when it is fully paid,

A judgment cannot be any more final than
A facially valid satisfaction is a

complete bar to any effort to alter or amend a judgment*

Morris

North American, Inc. v. King, 430 So.2d 592 (Fla. App. 1983).
See also Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Kriz, 515 So.2d 350 (Fla. App.
1987).
In Olsen v. Bd. of Ed. of Granite Sch. Dist., 571 P.2d 1336
(Utah 1977), this Court held that the trial court's judgment in a
condemnation case absolutely barred subsequent litigation of
issues covered by the judgment after the condemnation award it
granted had been fully paid.
B.

The Judgment in C84-4355 was "Final" Because it
did in fact Determine the Rights and Liabilities
of all the Parties and Reserved Nothing for Future
Determination.

In Bernard v. Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981), this Court
stated:

In deciding whether the court's order ...
constitutes a final judgment and as such
invokes the doctrine of res judicata we are
guided by Rule 54(b) ... (emphasis added)

629 P.2d at 895. Expressly, this Court chose to be "guided" by

-50-

Rule 54(b), not "bound" by it.

As pointed out supra, there is

persuasive authority that Rule 54(b)'s definition of finality
need not be dispositive in determining whether a claim is barred
by res judicatao
Even assuming Rule 54(b) contains the controlling standard
for when a judgment is sufficiently "final" to merit res judicata
effect, close analysis of the Judgment in C84-4355 reveals that
it was in fact "final", even under this standard.
No claim asserted in the prior action was left unresolved
or unforeclosed by Judge Wilkinson's ruling.

Clearly, the

Judgment did not leave unresolved the question of whether the
Bagel Nosh Lease was terminated.
the Lease remained in effect.

Judge Wilkinson expressly found

This finding was essential to his

ruling that the guarantors were liable for the unpaid rent and
other charges due under the Lease through December 10, 1984. If
the Lease had been terminated back in July of 1984, as Landes now
contends, the guarantors could not have been held liable for the
tenant's Lease obligations through December 10, 1984. The
Judgment expressly declares that the Bagel Nosh Lease and the
guarantor's liability under it were continuing. (R. 177-8).
The issue of Bagel Nosh's unlawful detainer status was
foreclosed by the Court's finding that the lease was still in
effect.

Having been granted Judgment for obligations owed under

the Lease through December 10, 1984, Olympus Hills could not
later seek a judicial determination that the Lease had been
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terminated the prior summer.
unlawful detainer claim.

The Judgment disposed of the

It left no claim resolved.

This Court's holding and rationale in Attebury, supra, are
contained in the penultimate paragraph of the opinion on page
896.

Illuminatingly, that paragraph ends with a footnote in

which this Court quotes approvingly from its opinion in State v.
Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 553 (1899):
In Booth we explain; "... where the rights of
the parties in an action, or a distinct and
independent branch thereof, are determined by
the court, and nothing is reserved for future
determination, except what may be necessary to
enforce the judgment or decision, the judgment
is final."
629 P.2d at 896.
Unlike in Attebury, the Judgment in C84-4355 "reserved
nothing for future determination".
raised in the pleadings.

It resolved all the issues

In Attebury,

the unlitigated claim was

the very claim the res judicata proponent wanted to have barred.
Here, the allegedly unlitigated question (whether Bagel Nosh was
in unlawful detainer) was actually resolved by the Judgment.

The

Judgment's declaration that the Lease was continuing meant, ipso
facto, that Bagel Nosh was not in unlawful detainer.
Freegard v. First Western Nat. Bank, 738 P.2d 614 (Utah
1987), cited by Landes, is unhelpful.

There, the court simply

found that a judgment dismissing one of several defendants in a
prior suit was not a final judgment because it left pending and
unresolved claims against the other defendants.
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As noted, Judge

Wilkinson's Judgment did not leave any pending unresolved claims.
It foreclosed any further claim by Olympus Hills against Bagel
Nosh in C84-4355.
Landes contends, however, that Galloway v. Mangum, 744 P. 2d
1365 (Utah 1987), supports his view.

The dispositive fact in

Galloway, in this Court's own words, was:
At the time the appeal was taken, Plaintiffs'
cause of action against AFCO and Affleck had
not been resolved and therefore remained
pending.
744 P.2d at 1366.

In C84-4355, the cause of action against Bagel

Nosh (for unlawful detainer) had been resolved by, the Court's
ruling that the Lease remained in effect.

No claim against Bagel

Nosh remained pending after the Judgment against Landes was
entered.
In Galloway, this Court concluded that due to the pending
unresolved claims against AFCO and Affleck, the Judgment against
Mangum was not appealable "in the absence of a proper
certification by the trial court".

The burden of seeking

certification of a non-final judgment must necessarily fall on
the party desiring to appeal.

Nothing prevented Landes from

seeking certification, if he felt the Judgment was non-final.
simply elected not to and chose instead to pay the Judgment.
Under such circumstances, his contending now that the Judgment
was not "final" is, in a word, nonsense.
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He

ARGUMENT VIII

ALTHOUGH SATISFACTION OF THE PRIOR JUDGMENT
SHOULD HAVE FORECLOSED LANDES FROM PRESENTING
HIS DEFENSES TO LIABILITY UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT TO LEASE, THE DISTRICT COURT ALLOWED
LANDES TO MAKE HIS ARGUMENTS. THEY WERE, HOWEVER,
UNCOMPELLING.
As explained in the preceding arguments and authorities,
the District Court was correct in its application of the
doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata.

The District

Court stated the matter with simple, forceful logic in its
memorandum decision:
The court cannot envision any greater
finality of a judgment than a party foregoing
its right to appeal ... and paying the
judgment in full. When defendant Landes
satisfied the Judgment, he gave up his right
to appeal and the satisfaction of the judgment
in the prior action now precludes defendant
Landes from asserting defenses to this action
because the defenses are barred by the
doctrines of res adjudicata and collateral
estoppel.
(R. 686).
Despite the District Court's summary judgment ruling,
when the case finally went to trial, Landes' counsel was given full
opportunity to litigate and argue the two defenses to liability he
identifies on page 35 of his brief.
on him-

No restrictions were placed

The Court noted this free rein in its memorandum

decision following the trial:
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20c The court, despite its previous rulings
not to allow defendant to raise certain
defenses to this action, did allow
defendants to raise the defenses and present
evidence in support thereof
(Re 726-7) (See also Finding of Fact No- 17, R. 752).
For these reasons and reasons set forth in the preceding
points in this brief, Landes' Argument VIII is without merit.

ARGUMENT IX
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT LANDES
HAD GUARANTEED THE LEASE BECAUSE, INTER ALIA, CUMULATIVE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF LANDES1 AGREEMENT TO GUARANTEE
THE LEASE MAKES THE EXECUTION OR NON-EXECUTION OF THE
SEPARATE GUARANTEE FORM (Exhibit "C" to First Amendment
to Lease) IMMATERIAL.
The Trial Court correctly found that Landes' liability as
guarantor was judicially established in the prior case (C84-4355)
and therefore not subject to relitigation in this case. Landesf
guarantor status is a "thing decided".

Although beyond contest

now, the thing was decided correctly for reasons including the
following.
Landes signed the First Amendment to Lease.
dispute that.

He does not

Exhibit "C" thereto, whether signed or unsigned,

is mere surplusage.
Landes' guarantee.

The signed First Amendment to Lease embodies

Paragraph 2 expressly amends Article I of the underlying
Lease by adding after the words "name of guarantor" the names of
Seftel and Landes (see Exhibit 3-P). Paragraph 8 of the document
expressly incorporates into the Lease a new section, Section
29.19, expressly naming Landes and Seftel as personal guarantors
of the Lease.

(Id.).

Following the execution of the First Amendment to Lease on
July 15, 1981, Olympus Hills allowed Bagel Nosh to remain in the
premises, despite its substantial default.

Unquestionably,

Olympus Hills had grounds and motive to evict its tenant at that
time.

The guarantee of Landes and Seftel provided the critical

consideration for allowing the Bagel Nosh Lease to remain in
effect.

Olympus Hills1 general partner testified that it was his

understanding that in signing the First Amendment to Lease,
Landes had personally guaranteed the tenant's obligations. (TR.
19-20).

Landes chose not to appear at trial and therefore could

not be questioned as to his understanding.
However, his understanding is amply reflected in his actions.
Landes acknowledged his having guaranteed the Lease when he
acquiesced in the entry of judgment against him for unpaid
past-due rent in C84-4355.

He further acknowledged it

by

paying the Judgment and by later paying ongoing rent obligations
on behalf of Bagel Nosh. (R. 195-199).

Further acknowledgment of

his continuing liability is found in his attorney's September 9,
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1985 letter indicating that Landes and Seftel "would like to be
released from their obligations under the Lease".

(R. 379).

The First Amendment to Lease binds Landes as a guarantor,
irrespective of the execution or non-execution of Exhibit "C"
thereto.

Landes1 own actions acknowledge this to be so*

ARGUMENT X
STEPS TAKEN IN THE PRIOR SUIT TO HAVE BAGEL NOSH
DECLARED IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER DID NOT TERMINATE
THE LEASE OR LANDES1 GUARANTOR OBLIGATIONS.
A.

Neither Service of the Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate
Nor the Filing of Olympus Hills' Complaint in the
Prior Suit Effected a Termination of the Lease, and
Landes* own Actions Manifest an Acknowledgment that
the Lease Remained in Effect.

Landes argues that the Lease was terminated in July of 1984
when the tenant and the guarantor failed to comply with Olympus
Hills1 Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate.

Landes' contention that

Olympus Hills' preliminary notice became self-executing in
terminating the contractual relationship between the parties is
absurd.
If Landes' contention had any merit, the Lease would have
been terminated three years earlier when the tenant failed to
comply with Olympus Hills' first Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or

Vacate.

After Bagel Nosh failed to comply with that Notice

(served March 3, 1981), Olympus Hills filed an Unlawful Detainer
Action to evict Bagel Nosh, C81-3101. As Landes well knows,
however, the Lease was not then terminated.

In settlement of the

suit, the parties entered into the July 15, 1981 First Amendment
to Lease, which allowed the tenant to remain in possession,
despite the unpaid rent arrearage, in exchange for Landes and
Seftel guaranteeing future payments under the Lease.

All this

is set forth in the preamble to the First Amendment to Lease.
(Exhibit 3-P).
Three years later, Olympus Hills again served a Three Day
Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate.

When it was not honored, Olympus

Hills again filed suit to evict the tenant.

As in the former

instance, settlement was reached under which the Lease was
allowed to remain in effect.

That settlement is embodied in the

stipulation filed with the Bankruptcy Court.

(R. 171-175).

Landes himself made subsequent rent payments under that
stipulation to assure that the Lease would remain in effect and
not be terminated. (R. 195-199).

Landes1 contention that the

Lease was terminated in July of 1984 is therefore ludicrous.
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B.

No Utah Case Holds or Even Suggests that an UncompliedWith Alternative Notice to Pay or Quit Operates as a
Self-Executing Termination of a Lease.

Landes claims non-liability as a lease guarantor on the
ground that the Lease was terminated by Bagel Noshfs
non-compliance with Olympus Hills1 July, 1984 Notice to Pay Rent
or Vacate.

This contention is inconsistent with the authorities

Landes claims support it.
None of the Utah cases cited by Landes in his Argument X
holds or even suggests that Landes' proposition is true.
fact, the cases support a contrary conclusion.

In

They are

considered below in the order they appear in Landes' brief.
In Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979), this Court
simply affirmed the trial court's finding that the landlord's
notice was defective and his unlawful detainer action was not
maintainable.

The case has no relevance here.

In Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982), this Court
actually held that a landlord's letter notifying his tenant of
termination of the lease did not terminate the lease.

In dictum,

the court stated that "a forfeiture of the lease may result by
virtue of a clause in the lease providing for forfeiture in case
of breach of covenant or condition".

However, the court did not

suggest that such a forfeiture is an automatic result of a
breach.

Instead, the court said: "where such is clearly provided

for, the courts will generally enforce it".
(emphasis added).

657 P.2d at 1275

The critical point is that whether a tenant is
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in unlawful detainer or a lease has been terminated are legal
conclusions which only a court can make.

In the case of Bagel

Nosh's Lease, no court found Bagel Nosh in unlawful detainer or
the Lease terminated.

On the contrary, Judge Wilkinson expressly

found that the Lease was still in effect long after service of
the Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate.
Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 1982), also does not
support Landes' theory of automatic, self-executing lease
termination by service of notice.

In Dang, as in the other

cases, this Court actually held that the tenant was not in
unlawful detainer because the notice was defective.

This court

also found that the notice did not effectuate a forfeiture of the
lease.

On page 662, this Court points out a critical distinction

between a notice of forfeiture (or termination) of a lease and a
notice of unlawful detainer.

The former "simply declares a

termination of the lease without giving the lessee the
alternative of making up the deficiency".

This court then states:

It would be anomalous to find that a notice
which gives the option of performance also
serves as a notice of forfeiture, which by
definition does not give that option.

655 P.2d at 662. The July, 1984 Notice on which Landes attempts
to rely did not declare that the Lease was being terminated.
Whether a notice which does unequivocally purport to terminate a
lease is self-executing without judicial affirmance is a
question which has no relevance to the case at bar.
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Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102 (Utah 1977),
is also unsupportive of Landes' contention.

That case involved a

month-to-month tenancy agreement providing that either party
could terminate by giving 15 days' written notice to the other
party.

There again, the notice was not an alternative notice to

perform or vacate, but simply a notice that the tenancy was over.
The tenant's performance or non-performance was not at issue.
The landlord had unequivocally indicated that he had cancelled
and terminated the rental contract.

In C84-4355, Olympus Hills

made no express cancellation or termination of Bagel Nosh's Lease.
Judge Wilkinson actually found that the Lease had not been
terminated.
In Jacobson v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294 (Utah 1954), the Court
again had under consideration an unconditional notice to quit,
not an alternative notice to pay or quit.

The notice

unconditionally declared the lease agreement terminated.
case is therefore inapposite.

That

Finally, Landes seeks reversal on

the basis of In Re Maxwell, 40 B.R. 231 (Bkrtcy. D.C. 111. 1984).
That case is of no help to this Court because it was decided
under Illinois law.

Whether the sending of a five day notice and

filing suit for possession terminates a lease under Illinois law
has no bearing in this case.

This Court interprets and follows

Utah law, not Illinois law.
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C.

In Utah, a Lease Allegedly Breached for Non-Payment of
Rent is not Terminated Until a Court Declares it so. The
Judgment in C84-4355 Precludes any Court from Declaring
the Bagel Nosh Lease Terminated as of July, 1984.

Courts in other jurisdictions have held that a lease is not
terminated for non-payment until a Court declares it so. See,
e.g. In Re Fountainebleau, 515 F.2d. 913 (5th Cir. 1975); Lemoine
v. Devillier, 189 So.2d 694 (La. 1966).

However, the search for

case authorities on this point is somewhat of a wild goose chase
because Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statute contains language
dispositive of the issue.

The statute makes clear that a lease

allegedly breached for non-payment of rent is terminated by
judicial declaration, not a party's allegation.
Section 78-36-10, Utah Code Ann., addresses the entry of
judgment after an unlawful detainer trial won by an evicting
landlord.

Subsection 1 states:
If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer
after ... default in the payment of rent, the
judgment shall also [in addition to ordering
restitution] declare the forfeiture of the
lease or agreement, (emphasis added).

The chief purpose of the Unlawful Detainer Act is to
discourage self-help in the area of landlord-tenant dealings and
to place the resolution of lease disputes with the court.
parties are to seek redress in the courts.
lease is to be declared by the court.

The termination of a

The statute itself so

states.
Here, Judge Wilkinson's Judgment in C84-4355 made it
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The

impossible for him or any other judge to declare the Bagel Nosh
Lease terminated as of July, 1984.

Do

Landes Failed to Plead his Novel Assertion that the July,
1984 Notice to Pay or Vacate Terminated the Lease. He
therefore Waived such Defense,

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a
defending party to set forth affirmatively "any ... matter
constituting an avoidance or an affirmative defense".

Under

12(a), a party waives all defenses and objections which he does
not present "either by motion as herein before provided [i.e. in
a pre-answer motion to dismiss] or, if he has made no motion, in
his answer or reply".
Landes1 theory that he is not liable as a guarantor of the
Lease because the Lease was terminated in July of 1984 would, if
true, constitute an avoidance or affirmative defense to Olympus
Hills1 action.

By failing to plead it in his answer, Landes

waived it.

ARGUMENT XI
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT LANDES PAID
THE PRIOR JUDGMENT "INVOLUNTARILY". MOREOVER, LANDES
COULD HAVE APPEALED, BUT CHOSE NOT TO.
Landes acknowledges the general rule that one who acquiesces
in a judgment by paying it cannot later attack that judgment.

However, he cites Idaho case law for the proposition that the
general rule does not apply when payment of the judgment is
"involuntary".

Even in Idaho, the alleged exception to the

general rule has been accorded limited, narrow application.
Bob Rice Ford, Inc. v. Donnelly, 563 P.2d 37 (Ida. 1977).

See

In

fact, in People ex rel. Neilson v. Wilkins, 614 P.2d 417 (Ida.
1980), the Idaho Supreme Court noted:
It is a matter of law that a party who does
"anything which savors of acquiescence in a
judgment cuts off the right of appellate
review" (citations omitted).
614

P.2d at 419.
There is no evidence that Landes paid the prior judgment

under duress

or "involuntarily".

No execution sale was scheduled

at the time Landes chose to confess judgment in New York and
propose his payment plan.

Landes simply desired to prevent damage

to his reputation in New York and to pay the Judgment on his own
terms.

It is noteworthy that Landes' voluntary Affidavit for

Judgment by Confession was signed on August 7, 1985 - nearly
eight months after the Utah Judgment was entered. (R. 188). His
appeal right had lapsed long before then.
Landes approved the Judgment which he now claims should
have no res judicata effect.
to set it aside.

(R. 178). He made no attempt

He made no attempt to appeal from it or, if

he felt appeal required certification under Rule 54(b), to
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request such certification.

In short, he slept on his rights.

Landes' conduct is very similar to the government's conduct
in United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
There, the government sought to avoid the effect of a prior
judgment, although it had taken no action to vacate it. The
District Court ruled that the prior judgment was res judicata.
Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed.

The

concluding paragraph of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Munsingwear is apropos here:
The case is therefore one where the United
States, having slept on its rights, now asks
us to do what by orderly procedure it could
have done for itself. The case illustrates
not the hardship of res judicata but the need
for it in providing terminal points for
litigation.
340 U.S. at 41.

ARGUMENT XII
THE FILING OF THE POST-TRIAL AFFIDAVIT ATTEMPTING
TO INFORM THE TRIAL COURT OF A UTAH BANKRUPTCY
JUDGE'S VIEW ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW QUESTION
RAISED BY LANDES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE
ERROR BECAUSE: 1) THERE IS NO INDICATION THE
COURT CONSIDERED IT; 2) THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
WAS BASED ON OTHER GROUNDS; 3) THE AFFIDAVIT
CONCERNED A MATTER OF LAW, NOT OF FACT; AND
4) THE AFFIDAVIT CONTAINED NO MORE HEARSAY
THAN MR. LETA'S TESTIMONY.
Contrary to Landes1 assertion, his argument that his
obligations under the Lease were terminated by Bagel Nosh's
alleged deemed "rejection" of the Lease under bankruptcy law was
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first raised at the time of trial.

Nowhere in the voluminous

memoranda Landes filed before and after the summary judgment
hearing

did he raise that contention.

Although Landes1 counsel

listed attorney David Leta as a witness, he did not disclose what
Mr. Leta's testimony would be.

At trial, Olympus Hills objected

to the Court allowing Mr. Leta to testify, arguing

that the

defense Landes was attempting to assert through Mr. Leta had not
been pleaded, that Leta's testimony was an unfair surprise, and
that Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not allow expert
testimony on law, but only on fact.

(TR. 203-207, 208). Over

Olympus Hills' objection, Mr. Leta was allowed to testify.
In this case, the submission of post-hearing and post-trial
memoranda, court opinions and letters was the rule, not the
exception.

Both counsel indulged in the practice.

613, 614; 615-625; 701-703; 713, 714-715, 716-717).

(R. 228-321;
Following

the trial, Landes' own counsel submitted to the Court a lengthy
letter and a copy of a bankruptcy decision in an effort to
persuade the Court that the law on the bankruptcy point in
question was as he contended it was.

(R. 692-699).

The submission of the Rainey affidavit was not, as Landes
asserts, "ex parte".

On the same day the affidavit was submitted

to the Court, a copy was hand delivered to Landes1 counsel.
703) .
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(R.

There is no indication anywhere in the record that Judge
Rokich considered the Rainey affidavit or that his decision was
based on it.
To the contrary, Judge Rokich made it very clear at trial
that he considered the bankruptcy issue

to be immaterial•

He

stated on the record his understanding that the bankruptcy
debtor's "rejection" of the Lease would not affect the
guarantor's liability regardless of whether such rejection was
deemed a breach or a termination of the Lease.

He based this

understanding on the testimony of Landes1 own expert. Landes1
counsel endorsed as accurate Judge Rokich1s understanding*

(TR.

240, 267; 237-8; See also Argument IV, supra).
To the extent that the bankruptcy law question raised by
Landes was of any interest to Judge Rokich, he should have been
free to consult any source as to what the law is.

If he

considered it appropriate to receive counsel on the law from Mr.
Leta, this Court should not consider reversible error an attempt
to present to Judge Rokich the view of one of Utah's own
bankruptcy judges on the same point of law.
It is true that Ms. Raineyfs affidavit contains hearsay.
However, the information contained in Ms. Rainey's affidavit is
hardly more hearsay than Mr. Leta's own testimony, which
consisted of telling the trial court what courts across the
country have said on the point in question.
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Such "testimony"

is just as much hearsay as Ms. Rainey's report of what Utah's
bankruptcy judge had said on the issue.
If determination of the bankruptcy question raised by Landes
really is important to a disposition of this case (and the trial
court found that it wasn't), this Court can decide that question
from its own analysis based on any legal authorities available to
it.

The trial court's possible consideration of an authority

contained in an allegedly inappropriate affidavit is no ground
for reversal.

If this Court finds the law to be as indicated in

the Rainey affidavit, submission of the affidavit at worst was
harmless error.

If this Court finds the law to be otherwise, it

may so declare, without even ruling on the propriety of the
Rainey affidavit.
Landes' appeal may be decided without this Court having to
address either the bankruptcy law issue or the propriety of the
Rainey affidavit.

Both issues are immaterial and this Court

should so find.

ARGUMENT XIII
LANDES' ARGUMENT THIRTEEN IS FRIVOLOUS AND
ILLUSTRATES HIS PROPENSITY TO MISSTATE FACTS
AND GRASP AT MERITLESS TECHNICALITIES.
In his Argument Thirteen, Landes argues that the District Court
committed prejudicial error when it refused to strike six
exhibits attached to Olympus Hills' summary judgment memorandum.
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In support of his argument, Landes represents to this Court that
his own Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on September 15,
1988, and that Olympus Hills' affidavit authenticating the
exhibits Landes sought to exclude was not filed until October 13,
the date the District Court ruled on the cross motions for
summary judgment.

These representations are untrue.

More

importantly, the argument they supposedly support is groundless.

A*

The Six Exhibits Landes1 Claims to be "Uncertified" Were
Authenticated Nearly a Month Before the District Court
Granted Olympus Hills' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

A true chronology of the events preceding the District
Court's ruling on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment
may be helpful to this Court.

It will also illustrate the modus

operandi of Landes' counsel.
Landes filed his Motion for Summary Judgment and his
Memorandum, containing 42 pages of arguments and exhibits, on
September 8.

(R. 366; 323-365).

He caused these documents to be

hand delivered to opposing counsel on that same day, thereby
denying Olympus Hills the additional three days of preparation
allowed under the rules when service is effected by mail.

(R.

367; 343). The following day - September 9 - he filed a Notice
of Hearing indicating that his Motion for Summary Judgment would
be heard on Monday, September 19 - just ten days later.
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The schedule thus set up by Landes allowed Olympus Hills
precious little time to respond to Landes1 lengthy Memorandum.
Olympus Hills filed a Cross Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on September 12.

On September 15, it filed its

Memorandum, with the six exhibits in question attached.
The following day - a Friday - Landes filed his Motion to
Strike.

A copy was served on Olympus Hills1 counsel late Friday

afternoon.

This gave Olympus Hills only the weekend to respond

to the Motion to Strike before the Monday hearing.
Olympus Hills' affidavit authenticating the exhibits Landes
wanted to keep the Court from considering is dated September 19
(R. 376) and was submitted to the Court and opposing counsel at
the beginning of oral argument on that date.
Undoubtedly because Judge Rokich kept the file in his
chambers from the time of the hearing until he rendered his
decision nearly a month later, the first page of the affidavit
bears an October 13 filing stamp.

It was not until then

that the affidavit could have been logged in by the court clerk.
Proof that the affidavit was submitted to the Court and opposing
counsel earlier than October 13 can be found in the fact that a
copy of the affidavit appears as an attachment to a discovery
pleading filed by Landes* attorney on October 3! (See R. 215, 216
(para. 3), and 219-24).

Further circumstantial evidence can be
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found in the fact that Landes1 own September 8 motion and
memorandum for summary judgment also bear the October 13 stamp of
the Clerk of the Court!
to believe that

Surely Landes does not expect this Court

his summary judgment papers were not filed until

the day the Court ruled on them.
Having orchestrated an unfairly short pre-hearing briefing
schedule, Landes should be censured for misrepresenting to the
Court the dates on which the pleadings were filed.
Thirteen

should be rejected as groundless.

His Argument

The exhibits were

timely authenticated.

B.

The Authenticity of the Exhibits, in any Event, is
Uncontestable, Particularly by Landes.

The six exhibits in question hardly require authentication.
The first was a stipulation filed in the Bankruptcy Court.

It

was executed by an attorney who represented Landes1 Bagel Nosh
Restaurant.

It is a public record of which the Court could take

judicial notice.
The second exhibit was a copy of the Judgment entered by
Judge Wilkinson in the prior suit (C84-4355).
submitted identical copies of that Judgment as

Landes actually
attachments to

his own memoranda (R. 323, 353-4; 584-5), and so has no standing
to complain of the Court's consideration of it.
The third exhibit is the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law supporting Judge Wilkinson's Judgment.
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Like the Judgment, it

bears the signature of Landes' own counsel - the very attorney
who argues that the exhibit should have been stricken as
"uncertified".

Moreover, the District Court could well take

judicial notice of the findings and conclusions since they are of
public record.
The fourth exhibit is an Affidavit for Judgment by Confession
executed by Landes himself.

If Landes contested the authenticity

of this exhibit, he could simply have said so.

He did not.

The fifth exhibit is a copy of the First Amendment to Lease.
Again, Landes has no standing to object to the Court's
consideration of that document because he submitted an identical
copy himself. (R. 356-359).
The sixth exhibit consists of copies of three checks drawn on
Daniel W. Jackson's client trust account, together with two
transmittal letters from Mr. Jackson dated April 29 and May 1,
1985, respectively.

If Mr. Jackson wished to deny that he signed

these letters and issued these checks, he could simply have said
so.

He did not.
Landes and his counsel should be ashamed for including

Argument Thirteen in their appeal brief.

The argument should be

summarily rejected.

CONCLUSION
The purpose of collateral estoppel is to prevent relitigation
of issues once decided.

The purpose of res judicata is to bar

claims and assertions which could have been made in prior
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litigation between the parties.

The purpose of judicial estoppel

is to bar a litigant from telling one court one thing and another
court another thing.

All three doctrines are intended to provide

"terminal points for litigation".

Allowing Landes to contest

his liability as a lease guarantor would do violence to these
doctrines, reward disingenuity and effectively render void the
Judgment, Findings and Conclusions entered in C84-4355.

The

District Court was correct in granting summary judgment to
Olympus Hills and limiting the trial solely to an issue of how
much money Landes owed under his obligations as guarantor of the
Lease.
Olympus Hills has suffered much since it agreed in 1981 to
keep the Bagel Nosh lease in force in exchange for Landes1
agreement to guarantee Bagel Nosh's performance.

Landes should

not be allowed to cause further grief and hardship by contesting
matters which have already been decided or by raising defenses
and claims he chose not to raise at earlier opportunities.

Under

the law, Landes1 liability as a guarantor is a "thing decided".
The decision was decided correctly in the first place and should
not be undone.
Compelling evidence was presented to the trial court that
Olympus Hills took commercially reasonable steps to mitigate its
losses.

The trial court's award of $75,000.00 for loss of

rentals was conservative in light of the evidence that Olympus
Hills' rent losses totalled $134,424.88.
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The award should be

upheld.
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reject the Lease.

Even if it had, the better view among

bankruptcy courts across the country is that such a rejection
would constitute merely a breach, not a termination, of the lease,
The whole point i$ immaterial, however, as far as a non-bankrupt
guarantor is concerned.
The other arguments raised by Landes on appeal are, on close
inspection, either patently absurd or immaterial.
The District Court's Judgment should be affirmed and Olympus
Hills should be awarded its reasonable attorney's fees incurred
in defending against Landes' Appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this O H\ day of February, 1990.

Douqlasr G. Mortens^en
Douglc
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Respondent
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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Daniel W. Jackson
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Michael Landes
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike
and Granting Plaintifffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (dated November I4, 1988)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, LTD. , >
>
a Utah Limited Partnership,
>
}
Plaintiff,
)
)
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LANDES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN, #2329
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244

;.<.

_ >-...' i '

z - -,A-w^J^kL^P^ :<_

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER,
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership
Plaintiff,

)

JUDGMENT

])

vs.
SYDNEY SEFTEL AND MIKE LANDES,
aka MICHAEL S. LANDES,

Civil No. C85-7821

]
'

(Judge John A, F.okich)

1

Defendants.

This case came on for trial on February 9th and 10th, 1989.
Planitiff

was

present

Skankey,

and

was

Mortensen.
bankruptcy

through

its

represented

by

general
its

partner,
counsel,

Richard
Douglas

Defendant Sydney Seftel was not present, having
during

the

pendency

of

this

action

prior

to

S.
G.

filed
trial.

Defendant Michael S. Landes was also absent, but was represented
by his counsel, Daniel W. Jackson.

The Court heard the testimony

of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, heard and considered
oral argument and took the matter under advisement.
of

the

arguments

evidence

and

submitted

all

of

herein,

the
and

memoranda
further

and

based

Based on all
other

on

the

written
Court's

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore entered herein,
and good cause appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
Plaintiff Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd
h e \ ^i

is

Michael

-VA-:

.-

:-. Landes .

•

:;.

ne same

: •

? r,e

r r :: c:pa-

av ^-r t

Ui' . 0 '

:o:

restoration dareoes, Logetner w i u int-^si Lner^i^ -* -h- ~ a *: nt
-Tun^

ten pei'cent per annur- f^^m
$75,, '",00 *<
t

:r,ss c: jental

"

*™oun t ..re, ae1 hev

damages

* *

nteres-

• •

portions thereof rrcrr,
tu

322,815

plus costs
Attorney'
t

7

•

*; *

. --

tr.rcugr jmt

'lus duLuine\

* ^r

m

^ amount- nf

,

^r rrndav

-

Exhib;

_

z±^

<:rcunt

as <*pt-

F

a.nourt:;.g
r ;!-. ->c

,

la.r. t.

; -• * -.

udgmen

-

the date hereof at the rate c.
Dated this _ , _

*A-.VM

day of May,

-; u »f: i

.^i arm

5 89,

John* A. Rokich
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form,.:

Daniel W. Jackson
Attorney for Defendant Michael

Landes

in

T.. .;'. v^-.w.ci D-.strsct

MAY 2 6 1883
DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN, #2329
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telechone: (801) 363-2244
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER,
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership
Plaintiff,
vs.

I
1

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

i

Civil No. C85-7 821

SYDNEY SEFTEL AND MIKE LANDES, aka '
MICHAEL S. LANDES,
)
Defendants.
]

(Judge John A. Rckich)

.his case came on for trial on February 9th and 10th, 19 89*
Planiuiff

was

present

Skankey,

and

was

Mcrter.sen.
bankruptcy

through

its

represented

general

by

its

partner,
counsel,

Richard
Douglas

S.
G.

Defendant Sydney Seftel was not present, having filed
during

the

pendency

of

this

action

prior

to

trial.

Defendant Michael S. Landes was also absent, but was represented
by his counsel, Daniel W. Jackson*

The Court heard the testimony

of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, heard and considered
oral

argument

and

took

the

matter

under

advisement.

Having

considered all of the evidence and all of the memoranda and other

written

submissions,

and

good

cause

appearing,

the

court

now

enter s i ts:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Several morrr-

Motion for Summary
a Motion

for

*ouior

--^

• -.=

I-

Summarv

: :r::.-i

•uaranto:

Judcment

- *g."*-u
-

and

i.:ca::cnF

W a s arc*" 3 c u _ e v a v " r

r*". I: • :•

ssues presented

;> i.-

r

defendant Landes"

' '•"*";ff"s rio*

N ^ s h Holdirc

Center

rr>rr

.ccateo

^vf. '"^ui L ruj.ec tuP:^

' * ~;.

^

ir : - * her

oy

• .-

: Ai , .: , . ..ic^cant L a n d e s

• Bagel

^.:
t'r r

.emea

^r.ir* • :

*:..-, S h o p p i n g

.
liability

..ereafter, Plalnti .ff filed

•-•-.-.•-

express"

.:iro'.k

Landes'

. - ' - .-

' '-*'* *: > ilcu:

preir.se :a

• u

.

i n ten si ve] \

In Ncvenrer

v

I

defendant Landes filed a

Summary Judgmenr

E;re

argued.

* .- * • - -r-.3.

- :.:J::^:

Partial

these

r

amoxir:

t'.argec

:

t o wt:
- -

-'
*• •

-*

u

L^.eLCar.t

accruing un .^r

Bagel Mesh Lease.
2.

Plaint i ff

^rd

Barrel

Mesh

HolcMnc

C A ^r,

Lease Agreement for -..• v.*;-- : - yea: * rir, <-v< ""' rppibp: 19
3.
executed

*-"" r

C

-.
;( ;;.jie::'

document provided

f

*-: ' :*".--<:

•: - sr

the Lease. as .-mended,
-" "V- f - 2 ]

A^er^imenr

or a g uarantee <f che Lease,

and Landes execut-;-.: the Fi rst Amendment

D e f enc

-~*-~

QT^^T^CI

and

Ii i signing
I a 11 < :I e s

Defendants Seftel

to Lease as guarantors of

the First Amendment to Leas**,

p e r s on a ] ] 1

_2-

lease

g 1 a 1: a 1:11 e e d

t: I: 1 e • t e:

the amended
separate

Lease.

The

"guarantee"

First Amendment

set

Amendment to Lease.

forth

as

to Lease refers

Exhibit

"C"

to

the

to a
First

Neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant Landes

was able to produce the "Exhibit C" at trial.
4.

Plaintiff

initiated

legal

action

against

Defendants

Landes and Seftel in 1984 and obtained judgments against them in
the sums of $30,710.70 and $5,457.93, respectively, for past-due
rent and other sums due.
5*

That action was Case No. C84-4255.

The judgments entered in C84-4255 were satisfied by the

Defendants.
6.

The Defendants did not take an appeal from either of the

judgments entered in C84-4255.
that

those

judgments

were

They later contended in this case

non-appealable

because

all

claims

against all of the parties were not adjudicated in Case No. C844255.
7.

This Court found that the Defendants precluded themselves

from taking an appeal from said judgments by paying and satisfying
such judgments and not ever raising the appealability issue until
this proceeding.
8c_

Bagel Nosh

Intermountain, Ltd. filed

for relief under

Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
9.

The bankrupt company was doing business as Bagel Nosh

Olympus Hills.
10.

The exact date that Bagel Nosh vacated the Olympus Hills

premises is unknown.
-3-

11.
the

The

,r:-^s^6

remain

in

tenant,

Bagel

Nosh,

p r e m i s e , but

cO "I . ••

and

premises

upon

the

actively conducting business
P 1 a i i '. L ::

l,: 1 o

discontinued
items of
for

doing

business

its personal

some

time

in

orccertv

after

:\

t:o

ceased

there.

:>.-.• - e.:.,.'..: i -L- • t <

p r e n: i i s e s :i i :i J i 11 i e o f 1 9 8 6

-ea sec

for the p u r p o s e of a t t e m p t i n g to relet the p r e m i s e s .
13

ix € not i estor ed to the o r i g i n a l

T h e p.] - • •- -

r e a s o n a b l e wear rinc teai
.1 4

excepted.

P l a i n t i f f a11eir.pted to re 1 et the prem,ises ,, b u t refused
f

r e 1 e t f e r a s h o r t t e r in. c i: t: o a
15.

Plaintiff

s h c i: t t e r m
the

condition,

had

* n: i : n t a i i < :I p o p'' c p e i a t i o n.

opportunities

to

lease

s i i c 1 i a s 11 i i: = e ;; e a i: s t o a

p ro s p ec t iv e

"! m o m

and

to

p o p':

t enan t s

the p r e m i s e s
and p o p n

'" m o m
dId

no t m ee t

for

a

op e r a t i on , b u t
P1 a i n t i f f " s

criteria.
• .. -.--r t:=*•_-.
awarded

f

]:: • i : > v i d e s

o tr-: /-uccessful party

f c• i

in an a c t i o n

a 11:c i: ne} ' s

filed

fee s

in relation

t: • :::: b e

to

the L e a s e .
>nrt
Defendan*

to

;.^sc;i>:~

:.-:.:-«- d e f e n s e s

ts
which

previ-jwere

•;

c

r-ulc have bee*"

* ' -r • -

i

d e f e n s e s and p r e s e n t e v i d e : c ^ . :
18v
restore

The

riaintiii

^h^ premises,

is

-

appc.L

v ;•

~\~
.t:-.-:-

of ten p e r c e n t p e r annuni from June 7 , 19 8 6.

-4-

raised
"r

:

such

thereof.

ent^' •-o

toaether

v

^;i
...-.*•

for

damages
*

":o
. e

19.
rentals

Plaintiff

is entitled to $75,000 in damages for loss of

from June 7,

1985

through

June 7,

1987

at

the rate of

$3,126.16 per month, together vith interest on the accruing amount
thereof

at

the

rate

of

ten

percent

per

annum.

The

total

prejudgment interest on this element of damage through May, 19 89
is $22,815.00.
20.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

attorneys

fees

of

$16,667,

together with its costs incurred in this action.
Based

upon

the

foregoing

findings

of

fact,

the

Court

now

enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Plaintiff had a valid and existing Lease with Bagel Nosh

Holding Corp.
2.

Defendant

Landes

and

Seftel

guaranteed

the

Tenant's

performance of the terms and conditions of the Lease.
3.

Neither

proceeding
Olympus

by

Hills,

the

Bagel
nor

filing
Nosh

Bagel

of

the

Intermcuntain,
Nosh's

Chapter

11

Ltd.,

dba

subsequent

Bankruptcy
Bagel

''rejection"

of

Nosh
the

Lease terminated the Lease.
4*

The Bagel Nosh bankruptcy proceedings did not affect the

obligations of the non-bankrupt guarantor or guarantors.
5.

The Plaintiff did not use its best efforts to relet the

premises.

-5-

c

rn\,p plaintiff

restore

T

Of

,- . -'

.r"

l

r>- premises,

:^aether *
> nh

Plaintiff
rentals
$3,li6o~6
thereof

from

is

entitled

.

-•

" *-

•.

r

;.i,ceti,er

are

iriteiebl.

*
,M" \ b i s

'
Ir

--.-—-

r , damages to

"erest inereon at • *-<?

$"":

* * -

p e r u^ntr,

prejudgment

:s ent'fle.-

•

damages

for
e

t

w:t

ir t e r e s *

*-. r.

e r v?r -

element

loss

of

rate

of

v; - r e accruing

ue:

oi; d a m a g e

a ' '.-^
through

.v~

Tin

amount
^t a l

Na / , 1V^9

$22,815.00
8.

together
Dated

?la:.nti£t
•*..;...
this

;

: -

*-S ^ . O . O ,.^ , u i ^

.

^ <: d a y o f H a y ,

:r;

*ir . * - .

19 8 9 .
By t h e C o u r t :

John A. Rokich
District Court Judge

Approved as to ^ ^

Daniel W. Jackson
Attorney for Defendant Michae] S, Landes

-6-

' 7,

